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THAT SERPENTINE WALL OF SEPARATION

John Witte, Jr.*
THOMAS JEFFERSON AND THE WALL OF SEPARATION BETWEEN

By Daniel L. Dreisbach. New York and Lon
don: New York University Press. 2002. Pp. x, 283. $42:

CHURCH AND STATE.

By Philip Hamburger. Cam
bridge and London: Harvard University Press. 2002. Pp. xiii, 514.
$49.95.
SEPARATION OF CHURCH AND STATE.

I.

INTRODUCTION

"The task of separating the secular from the religious in education
is one of magnitude, intricacy, and delicacy," Justice Jackson wrote,
concurring in McCollum v. Board of Education, the Supreme Court's
first religion in public schools case. 1 "To lay down a sweeping constitu
tional doctrine" of absolute separation of church and state "is to
decree a uniform . . . unchanging standard for countless school boards
representing and serving highly localized groups which not only differ
from each other but which themselves from time to time change atti
tudes. "2 If we persist in this experiment, Justice Jackson warned his
brethren, "we are likely to make the legal 'wall of separation between
church and state' as winding as the famous serpentine wall designed by
Mr. Jefferson for the University he founded."3
While a majority of the United States Supreme Court embarked
on a four-decade project of building this "serpentine wall,"4 Justice
Jackson took little further part in the effort. He continued to regard
the separation of church and state as essential to the protection of
* Jonas Robitscher Professor of Law, Director of Law and Religion Program, Director
of Center for the Interdisciplinary Study of Religion, Emory University. B.A. 19 82, Calvin
College; J.D. 19 85, Harvard. - Ed. My thanks to Harold Rerman, Russell Hittinger, Robert
A. Schapiro, and Charles A. Shanor for their helpful comments on a draft of this Review.

1. McCollum v. Bd. of Educ., 333 U.S. 203, 237 (19 48) (Jackson, J., concurring).
2. Id.
3. Id. at 238; see also DREISBACH, p. 109 .
4. DREISBACH, pp. 100-04 (summarizing cases); HAMBURGER, pp. 463-78. The most
recent Supreme Court cases where the separationist principle dominated the Court's rea
soning were Texas M ont hly Inc. v. Bullock, 489 U.S. 1 (19 89 ); Agui lar v. Felt on, 473 U.S. 402
(19 85); and Larki n v. Grendel' s Den Inc., 459 U.S. 1 16 (19 82).
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religious liberty, along with the freedoms of conscience,5 exercise, and
speech.6 But he had no patience with unilateral or extreme applica
tions of any of these First Amendment principles,7 not least the princi
ple of separation of church and state. Imprudent application of this
latter principle, he wrote, would draw the Court into "passionate
dialectics" about "nonessential details" that were often better left to
state and local governments to resolve.8 In his last years on the bench,
Jackson thus led the Court in a case that denied standing to a party
who argued that religious instruction in a public school violated the
separation of church and state.9 He was the sole dissenter in a church
property dispute case, where the Court read the principle of separa
tion to require a state to defer to the internal religious law of the dis
putants rather than apply its own state laws.10 He dissented again from
the Court's decision to uphold a public school program that gave stu
dents release time to participate in religious events off site.1 1 Arguing
that this was precisely the kind of case where the principle of separa
tion did apply, he complained: "The wall which the Court was pro
fessing to erect between Church and State has become even more
warped and twisted than I expected. "12
For all his growing misgivings about separationism, however, even
this bold dissenter on the Court,13 well trained in legal history,14 never
5. See, e.g., United States v. Ballard, 322 U.S. 78, 92-9 5 (19 44) (Jackson, J., dissenting
from decision to use the truth of a professed religious belief to question a party's sincerity);
Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 176- 78 (1944) (Jackson, J., dissenting from decision to
uphold child-labor laws against distribution of religious literature by a minor); West Virginia
State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 642 (19 43) (Jackson, J., writing for the majority, ex
empting Jehovah's Witnesses from compulsory flag salute).
6. See ROBERT H. JACKSON, THE SUPREME COURT IN THE AMERICAN SYSTEM OF
GOVERNMENT 76-77 (19 55); Paul A. Freund, Mr. J usti ce J acks on and Indi vi dual Ri ghts , i n
MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: FOUR LECTURES IN HIS HONOR 29 , 36- 43 (19 69 ) (summarizing
cases).
7. See, e.g., Kunz v. New York, 340 U.S. 29 0, 29 5- 314 (19 51 ) (Jackson, J., dissenting from
holding that a city may not deny a license to a Baptist preacher in a public park); Terme
niello v. Chicago, 337 U.S. 1, 13- 37 (19 49 ) (Jackson, J., dissenting from holding that free
speech protects anti-Semitic hate speech that causes riot); Saia v. New York, 334 U.S. 558,
566-72 (19 48) (Jackson, J., dissenting from holding that banning religious broadcasts without
a license violates free speech); Murdock v. Pennsylvania, 319 U.S. 105, 1 17-34 (19 43) (Reed
and Jackson, JJ., dissenting from holding that free-exercise rights prohibit laws requiring re
ligious solicitors to procure a license in advance).
8. Zorach v. Clauson, 343 U.S. 306, 32 5 (19 52 ) (Jackson, J., dissenting); s ee also
JACKSON, s upra note 6, at 65- 83 (examining role of Supreme Court in state and local dis
putes).
9 . Doremus v. Bd. of Educ., 342 U.S. 429 (19 52 ).
10. Kedroff v. St. Nicholas Cathedral, 344 U.S. 9 4, 12 6- 32 (19 52 ) (Jackson, J., dissenting).

1 1 . Z orach, 343 U.S. at 32 3-2 5 (Jackson, J., dissenting).
12 . Id. at 32 5.
13. See EUGENE c. GERHART, AMERICA'S ADVOCATE: ROBERT H . JACKSON 29 4-300
(19 58). Of Justice Jackson's 32 4 Supreme Court opinions, 109 were dissents, 63 concur-
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once questioned the historical foundation or constitutional imperative
of strict separationism. In Everson v. Board of Education,15 the
Supreme Court for the first time applied the First Amendment
disestablishment guarantee to the states. Justice Black, Jackson's
nemesis,16 wrote for the Everson majority. After a lengthy historical
recitation, Black quoted Thomas Jefferson's famous 1802 Letter to the
Danbury Baptist Association as dispositive evidence that the "First
Amendment has erected a wall of separation between church and
state" that "must be kept high and impregnable."17 Though Jackson
dissented from the Everson holding, he accepted the Court's account
of. the history and meaning of the First Amendment.18 Jackson was
concerned about the rhetorical "undertones" of "advocating complete
and uncompromising separation of Church from state."19 He was not
concerned about the historical underpinnings of separationism itself.
Indeed, Jackson thought his views to be in full accord with the intent
of the founders - not least his hero President Thomas Jefferson.20
Justice Jackson might well have come to a different opinion had he
enjoyed the luxury of reading the two exquisite books here under re
view. He would have learned that the history of separationism was far
more "serpentine" than the straightforward history lesson of Everson
had led him to believe. And he would have learned that the wall-of
separation metaphor was itself potentially "serpentine" - now in the
sense of the ancient serpent in the garden of Eden who offered access
to enduring wisdom by means of a seductively simple formula.21
"Metaphors in law are to be narrowly watched," Benjamin Cardozo
had warned in 1 926, "for starting as devices to liberate thought, they
end often by enslaving it. "22 So it has been with the metaphor of a wall
of separation.23 What started as one of several useful principles of

rences. Id. at 504 n.95; Bi bli ography: T he J udi ci al Opi ni ons of J usti ce Robert H. J ackson i n
t he Supreme Court oft he Unit ed St at es O ct ober 6, 1941 - O ct ober 9, I954, 8 STAN. L. REV.
60, 60-71 (1955).
14. See ROBERT H. JACKSON, THE STRUGGLE FOR JUDICIAL SUPREMACY (1941) (giving a detailed history of constitutional law).
1 5 . 330 U.S. 1 (1947).
16. Dennis J. Hutchinson, T he Black-J ackson Feud, 1988 SUP. er. REV. 203.
1 7. Everson, 330 U.S. at 18.
18. Id. at 28.
19. Id. at 19.
20. JACKSON, supra note 14, at 315 (discussing Jefferson).
21. Genesi s 3:1-7.
22. Berkey v. Third Ave. Ry. Co., 155 N.E. 58, 61 (N.Y. 1926).

23. See DREISBACH, pp. 107-28, and HAMBURGER, pp. 487-90, on the virtues and vices
of the wall metaphor.
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religious liberty eventually became a mechanical test24 that courts
applied bluntly, even slavishly, in a whole series of cases. What started
as one of many images25 of a budding new national law of religious
liberty, became for many the mandate and measure of the First
Amendment itself.
While the United States Supreme Court has, of late, abandoned
much of its earlier separationism,26 and overruled some of its harshest
applications in earlier cases,27 the wall-of-separation metaphor has
lived on in popular imagination as the salutary source and summary of
American religious liberty (Hamburger, pp. 1-8; Dreisbach, pp. 1-8,
107-28). Even popular imagination might change, if the findings of
Professors Dreisbach and Hamburger are taken seriously.28
II.

ENTER HAMBURGER AND DREISBACH

Between the two of them, Daniel Dreisbach29 and Philip Ham
burger30 tell much of the American history of the (wall of) separation
of church and state in its genesis, exodus, and deuteronomy
(1) its
origins in seventeenth- and eighteenth-century writings; (2) its migra
tion and manipulation in nineteenth- and early twentieth-century
American lore and law; and (3) its second legal life (its "deutero
nomos") in Everson and its immediate progeny.
Philip Hamburger's Separation of Church and State is a riveting
and recondite intellectual history of American separationism. The
heart of the book analyzes developments from Thomas Jefferson's
1802 Danbury Baptist Letter to . Justice Black's opinion in the 1947
Everson case (Hamburger, pp. 111-492). While Hamburger inevitably
covers some of the same ground broken earlier by Anson Stokes,31
-

24 . Lemon v. Kurtzman, 4 03 U.S. 602 (1971) (requiring that government policies chal
lenged under the establishment clause must 1) have a secular purpose; 2) have a primary ef
fect that neither advances or inhibits religion; and 3) not foster an excessive entanglement
between church and state).
25. For other images that were current, including "barriers," "fences," and "lines" of
separation, see DREISBACH, pp. 83- 89.
26. Zelman v. Simmons-Harris, 5 36 U.S. 639 (2002); Rosenberger v. Rectors of Univ. of
Va., 5 15 U.S. 81 9 (1995 ); Zobrest v. Catalina Foothills Sch. Dist., 5 09 U.S. 1 (1993); Bd. of
Educ. of the Westside Cmty. Sch. v. Mergens, 4 96 U.S. 226 (1990); Bowen v. Kendrick, 4 87
U.S. 5 89 (1 988); cases cited infra note 27.
27. Mitchell v. Helms, 5 30 U.S. 793, 808 (2000) (overruling Wolman v. Walter, 4 33 U.S.
229 (1977), and Meek v. Pittenger, 4 21 U.S. 34 9 (1975 )); Agostini v. Felton,5 21 U.S. 203, 235
(1 997) (overruling Aguilar v. Felton, 4 73 U.S. 4 02 (1985 )).
28. But note the tenacity of the separationist lobby as reported in Daniel L. Dreisbach,
Thom as J efferson an d the D an bury Bapti st s Revi si ted, 5 6 WM. & MARY Q. 805 (1999).
29. Professor, Department of Justice, Law, and Society, American University.
30. John P. Wilson Professor of Law, University of Chicago.
31. ANSON P. STOKES, CHURCH AND STATE IN THE UNITED STATES (1 95 0).

May 2003)

The Serpentine Wall

1873

Leo Pfeffer,32 Leonard Levy,33 and others,34 his book breaks much new
ground and blows much thick dust from long-forgotten archives.
Particularly novel and valuable is his treatment of separationism in the
last two-thirds of the nineteenth century, and his detailed analysis of
the shifting and sometimes overlapping views of separationism among
American Protestants, Unitarians, the National Liberal League, the
Ku Klux Klan, and sundry other groups (Hamburger, pp. 193-390).
Hamburger's volume brings to light and life scores of long-obscure
pamphlets, speeches, and sermons on separationism, many of which
have been known only to denominational specialists and church histo
rians.
Hamburger's writing throughout is lean, learned, and lively.
Convenient forecasts and summaries open and close each of the four
major sections of the book - "Late Eighteenth-Century Religious
Liberty," "Early Nineteenth-Century Republicanism," "Mid
Nineteenth-Century Americanism," and "Late Nineteenth- and Early
Twentieth-Century Constitutional Law." Crisp summaries again open
and close most of the fourteen meaty chapters. A detailed index
allows novices and experts alike to mine the book with profit. While I
have ample reservations about parts of Professor Hamburger's analy
sis,35 I believe his book will rightly become the standard intellectual
history of nineteenth-century American separationism for years to
come.
While Hamburger pans with a binocular to paint his panorama,
Dreisbach probes with an x-ray machine to interpret his texts. Quite
literally. In 1998, James Hutson, chief archivist at the Library of
Congress, had sent the original manuscript of Jefferson's 1802 Letter
to the Danbury Baptists, with all of its scratch outs and penned over
sections, to the FBI laboratory. Using x-rays and other techniques, the
FBI uncovered the full original letter with all its stops and starts,
thoughts and rethoughts spelled out.36 For Dreisbach, this is precisely
the sort of evidence that is needed to understand what Thomas

32. LEO PFEFFER, CHURCH, STATE, AND FREEDOM (rev. ed. 1967).
33. LEONARD W. LEVY, THE ESTABLISHMENT CLAUSE: RELIGION AND THE FIRST
AMENDMENT (2d ed. 1994).
34. STEPHEN M. FELDMAN, PLEASE DON'T WISH ME A MERRY CHRISTMAS: A
CRITICAL HISTORY OF THE SEPARATION OF CHURCH AND STATE (1997); THE WALL
B ETWEEN CHURCH AND STATE (Dallin H. Oaks ed., 1963).
35. See in fra notes 93-95, 1 17-118, 121-129 and accompanying text.
36. James H. Hutson, "A W al l of Separation ": FBI Helps Restore J eff erson 's O bl iterated
D raft, 57 LIBR. CONG. BULL. 1 36-39, 163 (1998). The original Jefferson letter is reprinted in
DREISBACH, pp. 144-46. It was the subject of a major confe rence, anthology, and literary
forum that Hutson, Dreisbach, and others helped to organize. See RELIGION AND THE NEW
REPUBLIC: FAITH AND THE FOUNDING OF AMERICA (James H. Huston ed., 2000) (based on
papers of a June 18-19, 1 998 confe rence at the Library of Congress); Forum, 56 WM. &
MARY Q. 775 (1999).
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Jefferson intended by his reference to a "wall of separation between
church and state." Dreisbach's analysis ripples out from this core 1802
text - reaching back to colonial and earlier European formulations of
separationism (Dreisbach, pp. 71-82), and forward to selected nine
teenth- and twentieth-century interpretations, including those of the
United States Supreme Court (Dreisbach, pp. 95-128).
This book is vintage Dreisbach.37 A neatly trimmed and tightly
written text of 128 pages is built on a scholarly foundation of even
greater thickness: eighty-nine pages of dense notes, twenty-four
pages of bibliography, and nine appendices with critical editions of
Jefferson's letters to and about the Danbury Baptists as well as other
key documents on religious liberty that Jefferson wrote as Virginia's
Governor and as America's President and aged savant. Any-one
studying Jefferson's views of separation would be wise to use Dreis
bach's primary texts and to ponder his interpretation of them. Anyone
studying the history of separation in America will find all manner of
literary leads in Dreisbach's hefty bibliography and detailed notes
(Dreisbach, pp. 155-269). This is a book that can be read in an even
ing, but pondered for a career.
These two books inevitably overlap somewhat in topics and texts
covered, but they are by no means duplicative. While the two authors
cite each other regularly and favorably,38 their interpretations differ
markedly at critical points.
First, Hamburger views Jefferson's 1802 letter as the first
full statement of separationism in America, deeply informed by
Jefferson's anticlericalism, religious individualism, Republican politics,
and scientific positivism. Both the term and the concept of
separationism, Hamburger argues, were notably absent from earlier
American and European writings, and conspicuously absent from the
debates over the First Amendment.39 By contrast, Dreisbach argues
that Jefferson maintained a common Western view that religious and
political authorities had to keep separate jurisdictions, a view that he
repeated many times in formal and informal writings before and after
1802. More important, Jefferson's 1802 letter simply repeated what the
founders commonly understood the First Amendment to be: It was a
declaration that the federal government ("Congress") had no jurisdic37. It is much in the style of RELIGION AND POLITICS IN THE EARLY REPUBLIC: JASPER
ADAMS AND THE CHURCH-STATE DEBATE (Daniel L. Dreisbach ed., 1996) and DANIEL L.
DREISBACH, REAL THREAT AND MERE SHADOW: RELIGIOUS LIBERTY AND THE FIRST
AMENDMENT 55-76 (1987). It also echoes and elaborates some of his earlier articles, cited in
DREISBACH, pp. 250-51 .
38. Dreisbach gave Hamburger's book a handsome jacket endorsement and cited him
several times throughout. DREISBACH, pp. 7, 29, 52, 200, 203, 225. Hamburger sent Dreis
bach his draft manuscript, DREISBACH, p. 272, and discussed his views generously. See
HAMBURGER, pp. 1-2, 4, 55, 159, 164, 259.
39. See infra notes 1 17-118 and accompanying text.
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tion over questions of religion and religious liberty; these were left to
the states to resolve in accordance with their own state constitutions.40
Second, Hamburger argues that, in the course of the nineteenth
century, strict separation of church and state became an American
ideal. It was the product of a growing alliance among "nativist
Protestants," theological liberals, anti-Christian secularists, and radical
groups like the .Know Nothings and Ku Klux Klan. These groups
adopted the principle of separation of church and state as a weapon
first against Catholics, then against clerics and religious groups
altogether. Because they feared religious organizations and authori
ties, these groups argued that religious liberty was principally an indi
vidual right that required a separation of church from state.41 By con
trast, Dreisbach sees little evidence of any sustained strict separation
of church and state in nineteenth-century law.42 Separationism did
gather ample rhetorical currency among some groups but garnered lit
tle legal change. The dominant reality of the nineteenth century was
that church and state officials were formally separate but functionally
cooperated in a variety of ways, particularly at the local level.43
Third, Dreisbach condemns Everson 's separationism as an
abruptly revisionist statement of constitutional law and a fundamental
misreading of the history and original intent of the eighteenth-century
founders, not least the views of Thomas Jefferson himself. For
Dreisbach, it was ultimately Justice Black, not Thomas Jefferson, who
raised strict separationism to a constitutional mandate.44 Hamburger
almost shrugs off Everson and its progeny as the inevitable triumph of
Jefferson's relentlessly separationist logic that had gradually gained
adherence and adherents in the nineteenth and early twentieth centu
ries. For Hamburger, Everson merely codified and culminated
common American sentiments, catalyzed more than a century before
by Jefferson and anticipated in many popular movements and legal
developments beforehand.45
What follows is a few of the high points of the long story of the
genesis, exodus, and deuteronomy of the principle of separation of
church and state. I focus first on earlier materials not included in
either volume. I then turn to a few topics and texts on which these two
authors differ markedly in interpretation or where my own interpreta
tion of the sources differs from one or both of theirs.

40. Seei nfra note 116 and accompanying text.
41. Seei nfra notes 105-106 and accompanying text.
42. Seei nfra notes 149-152 and accompanying text.
43. Seei nfra notes 139-147 and accompanying text.
44. Seei nfra note 155 and accompanying text.
45. Seei nfra notes 105-106, 155 and accompanying text.
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GENESIS: THE ROOTS OF AMERICAN SEPARATIONISM
A.

Biblical Roots

Though it makes only modest appearance in these two volumes,
(Hamburger, pp. 22, 29, 41, 44, 48; Dreisbach, p. 230 n.4), the Bible
was the starting point for a good deal of Western speculation on the
(wall of) separation of church and state. In the Hebrew Bible, the
chosen people of ancient Israel were repeatedly enjoined to remain
separate from the Gentile world around them46 and to separate the
Levites and other temple officials from the rest of the people.47 The
Hebrew Bible also made much of building and rebuilding "fortified
walls"48 to protect the city of Jerusalem from the outside world and to
separate the temple and its priests from the commons and its people49
- an ancient tradition still recognized and symbolized in the Jewish
rituals and prayers that take place at the Western (Wailing) Wall.
The New Testament commanded believers to "render to Caesar
the things that are Caesar's and to God the things that are God's,"50
and reminded them that "two swords" were enough to govern the
world.51 Christians were warned that they should "be not conformed to
this world"52 but remain "separate" from the world and its tempta
tions,53 maintaining themselves in purity and piety. Echoing the He
brew Bible, St. Paul spoke of a "wall of separation" (paries maceriae)
between Christians and non-Christians interposed by the Law.54 Inter
spersed among these various political dualisms, the Bible included
many other dualisms - between spirit and flesh, soul and body, faith
and works, heaven and hell, grace and nature, the kingdom of God
and the kingdom of Satan, and much more.55

46. 1 Esdras 7 -9; Exodus 34:1 1-16; Ezra 6:21 , 10: 1 ; 1Kings 8:53; Leviticus 20: 24-5; Ne
hemiah 9:1-15, 10:28-31,1 3: 1-3; 2 Samuel 22: 26-7 .
47 . 1 Chronicles 23: 13; Deuteronomy 1 0: 8, 32:8; Ezekial 40-42; Leviticus 21:1-22: 16;
Numbers 8:14, 16:9.
48. Jeremiah 1 :1 8, 15:20.
49. Ezekial 42:1 ; Jeremiah 1: 18-19, 1 5:19-21; 1Kings 3:1; Nehemiah 3:1-32, 4: 15-20, 12:27 43.
50. Mark 12:17 ; Matthew 22: 21 ; Luke 20: 25.
51 . Luke 22:38.
52. Romans 12:2.
53. 2 Corinthians 6:1 4-1 8.
54. Ephesians 2:14. See historical interpretation of this text in MARKUS BARTH, THE
ANCHOR BIBLE: EPHESIANS 263-65, 283-87 (1 97 4) .
55. OLIVER O'DONOVAN, THE DESIRE OF THE NATIONS: REDISCOVERING THE ROOTS
OF POLITICAL THEOLOGY 82-11 9, 193-211 ( 1996) .
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Early Catholic Models
1.

Two Communities

These various biblical dualisms were repeated in some of the early
church constitutions. Among the earliest was the Didache (ca. 120
c.e.), which opened with a call for believers to separate from the world
around them: "There are two Ways, one of Life and one of Death; but
there is a great separation between the two Ways."56 The Way of Life
follows the commandments of law and love. The Way of Death
succumbs to sins and temptations. The two ways must remain utterly
separate, and those who stray from the Way of Life must be cast out.
The Epistle of Barnabas (ca. 100-120 c.e.) provided similarly:
There are two ways of teaching and of authority, one of light and one of
darkness. And there is a great difference between the two ways. For over
one are set light-bearing angels of God, but over the other angels of Sa
tan. And the one is Lord from eternity to eternity, but the other is prince
of the present time of darkness. 75

These dualistic adages and images recurred in scores of later
apostolic and patristic writings of the second through fifth centuries both in the East and in the West.58 They became the basis for one per
sistent model of separationism in the Christian West - the separation
of the pure Christian life and community governed by religious
authorities from the sinful and sometimes hostile world governed by
political authorities. This apostolic ideal of separationism found its
strongest and most enduring institutional form in monasticism, which
produced a vast archipelago of communities of spiritual brothers and
sisters, each walled off from the world around them.59 But separation
ism in this sense also remained a recurrent spiritual ideal in Christian
theology and homiletics - a perennial call to Christians to keep the
Way of Life in the community of Christ separate from the Way of
Death in the company of the Devil.
56. Reprinted in PHILIP SCHAFF, THE TEACHING OF THE TWELVE APOSTLES 1 62 -63
(1889) (my translation). Several comparable formulae from the apostolic sources are quoted
in id. at 163 n . 1 . See comparable language in Deuteronomy 30: 15; Jeremiah 2 1: 8: Matthew
7:13-14; and 2 Peter2 2: .
57. Reprinted in SCHAFF, supra note 56, at 22 7-2 8.
58. Id. at 18; GERARD E. CASPARY, POLITICS AND EXEGESIS: ORIGEN AND THE Two
SWORDS (1 979); LESTER L. FIELD, JR., LIBERTY, DOMINION, AND THE Two SWORDS: ON
THE ORIGINS OF WESTERN POLITICAL THEOLOGY 180 -398 (1998); ADOLF HARNACK, THE
CONSTITUTION AND LAw OF THE CHURCH IN THE FIRST Two CENTURIES (F.L. Pogson
trans., H.D.A. Major ed., 1910 ).
59. GERD TELLENBACH, CHURCH, STATE AND CHRISTIAN SOCIETY 2 5-2 9 (R.F.
Bennett trans., 1959). See sources and discussion in MARILYN DUNN, THE EMERGENCE OF
MONASTICISM: FROM THE DESERT FATHERS TO THE EARLY MIDDLE AGES (2000 ); DAVID
KNOWLES, CHRISTIAN MONASTICISM (1 969); and C.H. LAWRENCE, MEDIEVAL
MONASTICISM: FORMS OF RELIGIOUS LIFE IN WESTERN EUROPE IN THE MIDDLE AGES (3d
ed. 200 1).
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Two Cities

By the fifth century, Western Christianity had distilled these early
biblical teachings into other models of separationism. The most
famous was the image of two cities within one world, developed by St.
Augustine, Bishop of Hippo. In his City of God (c. 413-427),60
Augustine contrasted the city of God with the city of man. The city of
God consisted of all those who were predestined to salvation, bound
by the love of God, and devoted to a life of Christian piety, morality,
and worship led by the Christian clergy. The city of man consisted of
all the things of this sinful world, and the political and social institu
tions that God had created to maintain a modicum of order and
peace.61 Augustine sometimes depicted this dualism as two walled
cities separated from each other62 - particularly when he was
describing the sequestered life and discipline of monasticism or the
earlier plight of the Christian churches under Roman persecution.63
But Augustine's more dominant teaching was that dual citizenship in
both cities would be the norm until these two cities were fully and
finally separated at the Last Judgment of God.64 For Augustine, it was
ultimately impossible to achieve complete separation of the city of
God and the city of man in this world. A Christian remained bound by
the sinful habits of the world, even if he aspired to greater purity of
the Gospel. A Christian remained subject to the authority of both
cities, even if she aspired to be a citizen of the city of God alone.
3.

Two Powers

It was crucial, however, that the spiritual and temporal powers that
prevailed in these two cities remain separate in function. Even though
Christianity became the one established religion of the Roman
Empire, patronized and protected by the Roman state authorities,
Augustine and other Church Fathers insisted that state power remain
separate from church power. All magistrates, even the Roman emper
ors, were not ordained clergy but laity. They had no power to adminis60. ST. AUGUSTINE, CITY OF Goo 84-89, 460-73, 483-506 (Gerald G. Walsh et al. trans.,
Vernon J. Bourke ed., 1958) [hereinafter CITY OF Goo].
61. Id. at 494-506.
62. Id. at 466-72; see also THE POLITICAL WRITINGS OF ST. AUGUSTINE 241-75, 305-17
(Henry Paolucci ed., 1962) (letters arguing that the authority of church and state are sepa
rate but subject to the same power of God who enjoins Christian morality on both).
63. See examples in JEAN BETHKE ELSHTAIN, AUGUSTINE AND THE LIMITS OF
POLITICS (1995); J. VAN OORT, JERUSALEM AND B ABYLON: A STUDY INTO AUGUSTINE'S
CITY OF Goo AND THE SOURCES OF HIS DOCTRINE OF THE Two CITIES (1990); and
EUGENE TESELLE, LIVING IN Two CITIES: AUGUSTINIAN TRAJECTORIES IN POLITICAL
THOUGHT (1998).
64. CITY OF Goo, supra note 60, at 481-93.
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ter the sacraments or to mete out religious discipline. They were
bound by the teachings of the Bible, the decrees of the ecumenical
councils, and the. traditions of their predecessors. They also had to
accept the church's instruction, judgment, and spiritual discipline.
Pope Gelasius put the matter famously in 494 in a letter rebuking
Emperor Anastasius:
There are indeed, most august Emperor, two powers by which this world
is chiefly ruled: the sacred authority of the Popes and the royal power. Of
these the priestly power is much more important, because it has to ren
der account for the kings of men themselves at [the Last Judgment]. For
you know, our very clement son, that although you have the chief place
in dignity over the human race, yet you must submit yourself faithfully to
those who have charge of Divine things, and look to them for the means
of your salvation. 65

This "two powers" passage became a locus classicus for many later
theories of a basic separation between pope and emperor, clergy and
laity, regnum and sacerdotium.66
4.

Two Swords

In the course of the Papal Revolution67 of the eleventh to thir
teenth centuries, this model of two separate powers within the
extended Christian empire was transformed into a model of two
swords ruling a unified Christendom.68 In the name of "freedom of the
church" (libertas ecclesiae), Pope Gregory VII (1073-1085) and his
successors threw off their political patrons and protectors and estab
lished the Catholic Church itself as the superior legal and political
·authority of Western Christendom. The church now claimed more
than a spiritual and sacramental power over its own affairs, a spiritual
office within the Christian empire. It claimed a vast new j urisdiction, a
political authority to make and enforce laws for all of Christendom.
The pope and the clergy claimed exclusive personal jurisdiction
over clerics, pilgrims, students, heretics, Jews, and Muslims. They
claimed subject matter jurisdiction over doctrine, liturgy, patronage,
education, charity, inheritance, marriage, oaths, oral promises, and
moral crimes. And they claime<:l concurrent jurisdiction with state
65. Quoted i n CHURCH AND STATE THROUGH THE CENTURIES: A COLLECTION OF
HISTORIC DOCUMENTS WITH COMMENTARIES 10-11 (Sidney Z. Ehler & John B. Morrall
trans. & eds., 1954) [hereinafter CHURCH AND STATE].
66. See, e.g., ERNST H. KANTOROWICZ, THE KING'S Two BODIES: A STUDY IN
MEDIAEVAL POLITICAL THEOLOGY (1957); KARL FREDERICK MORRISON, THE Two
KINGDOMS: ECCLESIOLOGY IN CAROLINGIAN POLITICAL THOUGHT (1964).
67. The tem1 was made popular by HAROLD J. BERMAN, LAW AND REVOLUTION: THE
FORMATION OF THE WESTERN LEGAL TRADITION (1983).
68. For the transmutation of the two-powers image to two swords, see B RIAN TIERNEY,
THE CRISIS OF CHURCH AND STATE 1050-1300, at 53 (1964).
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authorities over secular subjects that required the Church's special
forms of Christian equity.69 A vast body of new church law, called
canon law, issued by popes, bishops, and church councils came to gov
ern Western Christendom. A vast network of church courts, headquar
tered in the papal court, enforced these laws throughout the West.70 In
the period from ca. 1 150-1350, the Roman Catholic Church ironically
became "the first modern state" in the West.71 The Church's canon law
became the first system of modern international law.
This late medieval system of church government and law was
grounded in part in the two-swords theory. This theory taught that the
pope is the vicar of Christ, in whom Christ has vested his whole
authority.72 This authority was symbolized in the "two swords"
discussed in the Bible (Luke 22:38), a spiritual sword and a temporal
sword. Christ had metaphorically handed these two swords to the
highest being in the human world - the pope, the vicar of Christ. The
pope and lower clergy wielded the spiritual sword, in part by estab
lishing canon law rules for the governance of all Christendom. The
clergy, however, generally delegated the temporal sword to those
authorities below the spiritual realm - emperors, kings, dukes, and
their civil retinues, who held their swords "of" and "for" the church.
These civil magistrates were to promulgate and enforce civil laws in a
manner consistent with canon law. Under this two-swords theory, civil
law was by its nature preempted by canon law. Civil jurisdiction was
subordinate to ecclesiastical jurisdiction. The state answered to the
church.73 Pope Boniface VIII put this two-swords theory famously and
forcefully in 1302:
We are taught by the words of the Gospel that in this Church and in its
power there are two swords, a spiritual, to wit, and a temporal. . . . [B]oth
are in the power of the Church, namely the spiritual and [temporal]
swords; the one, indeed, to be wielded for the Church, the other by the
Church; the former by the priest, the latter by the hand of kings and
knights, but at the will and sufferance of the priest. For it is necessary
that one sword should be under another and that the temporal authority

69. See BERMAN, supra note 67, at 85-119, 1 65-200; Udo Wolter, Amt und Officium in
mittelalterlichen Quellen vom 13. bis 15. Jahrhundert, 105 ZEITSCHRIFT DER SAVIGNY
STIFTUNG (KAN. AB.) 246 (1 988).
70. B ERMAN, suprq note 67, at 1 99-254; R.H. HELMHOLZ, THE SPIRIT OF CLASSICAL
CANON LAW ( 1 996).
71. The phrase is from F.W. Maitland, quoted and elaborated in BERMAN, supra note
67, at 1 13-15.
72. BRIAN TIERNEY, THE ORIGINS OF PAPAL INFALLIBILITY, 1 1 50-1350, at 39-45, 821 21 (1972).
73. On various medieval formulations, see OTTO GIERKE, POLITICAL THEORIES OF
THE MIDDLE AGE 7-21 (Frederic William Maitland trans., .1958); 2 EWART LEWIS,
MEDIEVAL POLITICAL IDEAS 506-38 (1954). For patristic antecedents, see CASPARY, supra
note 58, and FIELD, supra note 58.
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should be subjected to the spiritual. . . . If, therefore, the earthly power
err, it shall be judged by the spiritual power; if the lesser spiritual power
err, it shall be judged by the higher, competent spiritual power; but if the
supreme spiritual power [i.e., the pope] err, it could be judged solely by
God, not by man. 7 4

Two communities, two cities, two powers, two swords: These were
four models of separationism tha.t obtained in. the Western Catholic
tradition in the first 1500 years. Each model emphasized different bib
lical texts. Each started with a different theory of the church. But each
was designed ultimately to separate the church from the state. On one
extreme, the apostolic model of two communities was a separationism
of survival - a means to protect the church from a hostile state and
pagan world. On the other. extreme, the late medieval model of two
swords was a separation of preemption - a means to protect the
church in its superior legal rule within a unified world of Christendom.
C.

Early Protestant Models

The sixteenth-century Protestant Reformation began as a call for
freedom from the late medieval "two swords" regime - freedom of
the church from the tyranny of the pope, freedom of the individual
conscience from canon law and clerical control, freedom of state offi
cials from church power and privilege. "Freedom of the Christian" was
the rallying cry of the early Reformation.75 Catalyzed by Martin
Luther's posting of the Ninety-Five Theses in 1517 and his burning of
the canon law books in 1520, early Protestants denounced church laws
and authorities in violent and vitriolic terms, and urged radical
reforms of church and state on the strength of t°he Bible.76
After a generation of experimentation, however, the four branches
of the Protestant Reformation returned to variations of the same four
models of separationism that the earlier Catholic tradition had forged
- two communities, two cities, two powers, two swords - adding new
accents and applications.
1.

Two Communities

The Anabaptist tradition - Amish, Hutterites, Mennonites, Swiss
Brethren, German Brethren, and others - returned to a variation of
the apostolic model of two communities. Most Anabaptist communi74. Quoted in CHURCH AND STATE, supra note 65, at 91-92. For other such later medie
val formulations, see TIERNEY, supra note 68, at 180.
75. MARTIN LUTHER, FREEDOM OF A CHRISTIAN (1520), reprinted in 31 LUTHER'S
WORKS 327-77 (W. A. Lambert trans., J. Pelikan ed., 1968).
76. See sources and discussion in JOHN WITTE, JR., LAW AND PROTESTANTISM: THE
LEGAL TEACHINGS OF THE LUTHERAN REFORMATION 33-64 (2002) [hereinafter WITTE,
LAW AND PROTESTANTISM] .
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ties separated themselves into small, self-sufficient, intensely demo
cratic communities, cordoned off from the world by what they called a
"wall of separation."77 These separated communities governed them
selves by biblical principles of discipleship, simplicity, charity, and
nonresistance. They set their own internal standards of worship,
liturgy, diet, discipline, dress, and education. They handled their own
internal affairs of property, contracts, commerce, marriage, and inheri
tance, without appeal to the state or to secular law.78
The state, most Anabaptists believed, was part of the fallen world,
and was to be avoided so far as possible. Though once the perfect
creation of God, the world was now a sinful regime "beyond the
perfection of Christ"79 and beyond the daily concern of the Christian
believer. God had allowed the world to survive by appointing magis
trates who used the coercion of the sword to maintain a modicum of
order and peace. Christians should thus obey the state, so far as Scrip
ture enjoined, such as in paying their taxes or registering their proper
ties. But Christians were to avoid active participation in and interac
tion with the state and the world. Most early-modern Anabaptists
were pacifists, preferring derision, exile, or martyrdom to active
participation in war. Most Anabaptists also refused to swear oaths, or
to participate in political elections, civil litigation, or civic feasts and
functions.80
This early Anabaptist separationism was echoed in the seventeenth
century by Rhode Island founder Roger Williams, who called for a
"hedge or wall of Separation between the Garden of the Church and
the Wilderness of the world."81 It was elaborated by American Baptist
and other Evangelical groups born of the Great Awakening ( c. 17201780). These latter American groups were principally concerned to
protect their churches from state interference. They strove for free
dom from state control of their assembly and worship, state regula77. The phrase is from Menno Simons, quoted by DREISBACH, p. 73. See comparable
sentiments in THE COMPLETE WRITINGS OF MENNO SIMONS, c. 1496-1561, at 29, 1 17-20,
1 58-59, 190-206 (L. Verduin trans., J.C. Wenger ed., 1984). See also the call for "separation"
in the Schleitheim Confession (1 527), art. 4, in HOWARD J. LOEWEN, ONE LORD, ONE
CHURCH, ONE HOPE, AND ONE Goo: MENNONITE CONFESSIONS OF FAITH IN NORTH
AMERICA 79-84 ( 1985). For the Biblical roots of this Anabaptist separationism, see
BIBLICAL CONCORDANCE OF THE SWISS BRETHREN, 1540, at 56-60 (Gilbert Fast & Galen
A. Peters trans., C. Arnold Synder ed., 2001) (a frequently reprinted volume listing all the
biblical passages on separation that were to be the subject of Anabaptist sermons, devotions,
and catechesis).
78. See illustrative texts in ANABAPTISM IN OUTLINE 101- 14, 211-32 (Walter Klaasen
ed., 1981).
79. This language is from the Schleitheim Confession (1527), art. 6, supra note 77, at 8081.
80. See samples in ANA BAPTISM IN OUTLINE, supra note 78, at 244-63.
81 . Letter from Roger Williams to John Cotton (1643), in 1 THE COMPLETE WRITINGS
OF ROGER WILLIAMS 392 (1963).

May 2003]

The Serpentine Wall

1883

tions of their property and polity, state incorporation of their society
and clergy, state interference in their discipline and government, and
state collection of religious tithes and taxes. Some American Baptist
groups went further to argue against tax exemptions, civil immunities,
and property donations as well. Religious bodies that received state
benefits, they feared, would become too beholden to the state and too
dependent on its patronage for survival.82
2.

Two Kingdoms

The Lutheran tradition returned to a variation on Augustine's two
cities theory. The fullest formulation came in Martin Luther's complex
two-kingdoms theory, which provided what Luther called a "paper
wall" between the spiritual and temporal estates.83 God has ordained
two kingdoms or realms in which humanity is destined to live, Luther
argued, the earthly kingdom and the heavenly kingdom. The earthly
kingdom is the realm of creation, of natural and civic life, where a
person operates primarily by reason and law. The heavenly kingdom is
the realm of redemption, of spiritual and eternal life, where a person
operates primarily by faith and love. These two kingdoms embrace
parallel forms of righteousness and justice, government and order,
truth and knowledge. They interact and depend upon each other in a
variety of ways. But these two kingdoms ultimately remain distinct.
The earthly kingdom is distorted by sin and governed by the Law. The
heavenly kingdom is renewed by grace and guided by the Gospel. A
Christian is a citizen of both kingdoms at once and invariably comes
under the distinctive government of each. As a heavenly citizen, the
Christian remains free in his or her conscience, called to live fully by
the light of the Word of God. But as an earthly citizen, the Christian is
bound by law, and called to obey the natural orders and offices of
household, state, and visible church that God has ordained and main
tained for the governance of this earthly kingdom.
In Luther's view, the church was not a political or legal authority.
The church has no sword, no jurisdiction, no daily responsibility for
law. The church and its leadership were to separate itself from legal
affairs and attend to the principal callings of preaching the word,
administering the sacraments, catechizing the young, and helping the
needy. While the church should cooperate in implementing laws, and

82. See sources in WILLIAM G. MCLOUGHLIN, NEW ENGLAND DISSENT, 1630-1833:
THE BAPTISTS AND THE SEPARATION OF CHURCH AND STATE (1971); WILLIAM G.
MCLOUGHLIN, SOUL LIBERTY: THE BAPTISTS' STRUGGLE IN NEW ENGLAND, 1630-1833
(1991); and ISAAC BACKUS ON CHURCH, STATE, AND CALVINISM: PAMPHLETS, 1754-1789
(William G. McLaughlin ed., 1968).
83. Detailed sources for this subsection are in WITTE, LA w AND PROTESTANTISM, supra
note 76, at 87-117.
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its clergy and professors were to preach against injustice, formal legal
authority lay with the state.
The local magistrate was God's vice-regent called to elaborate
natural law and to reflect divine justice in his local domain. The local
magistrate was also the "father of the community" (Landesvater). Like
a loving father, he was to keep the peace and to protect his subjects in
their persons, properties, and reputations. He was to deter his subjects
from abusing themselves through drunkenness, sumptuousness,
gambling, prostitution, and other vices. He was to nurture his subjects
through the community chest, the public almshouse, and the state-run
hospice. He was to educate them through the public school, the public
library, and the public lectern. He was to see to their spiritual needs by
supporting the ministry of the local church, and encouraging atten
dance and participation through civil laws of religious worship and
tithing.84
3.

Two Powers

The Calvinist Reformation returned to a vanat1on on the two
powers model, in which both church and state exercised separate but
coordinate powers within a unitary local Christian commonwealth.85
Calvinists insist�d on the basic separation of the offices and operations
of church and state. Adverting frequently to St. Paul's image of a "wall
of separation," John Calvin insisted that the "political kingdom" and
"spiritual kingdom" must always be "examined separately." For there
is "a great difference . . . between ecclesiastical and civil power," and it
would be unwise to "mingle these two, which have a completely dif
ferent nature."86 But Calvin and his followers insisted that the church
play a role in governing the local Christian commonwealth. In Calvin's
Geneva, this role fell largely to the consistory, an elected body of civil
and religious officials, with original jurisdiction over cases of marriage
and family, charity and social welfare, worship and public morality.
Among most later Calvinists - French Huguenots, Dutch Pietists,
Scottish Presbyterians, German Reformed, and English Puritans the Genevan-style consistory was transformed into the body of
pastors, elders, deacons, and teachers that governed each local church
congregation without state interference and cooperated with state of
ficials in defining and enforcing public morals.87
84. See sources and discussion ini d. at 108-15, 129-40, 147-64.
85. Detailed sources for this subsection are in John Witte, Jr., Moderate Religious Lib
erty in the Theology ofJohn Calvin, 31 CALVIN THEOLOGICAL J. 359, 392 (1996).
86. See, e.g., JOHN CALVIN, INSTITUTES OF THE CHRISTIAN RELIGION 847, 1215, 1486
(F .L . Battles trans., John T. McNeill ed., 1960) (1559); see also 39 IOANNIS CALVIN!, OPERA
QUAE SUPERSUNT OMNIA 352 (G. Baum et al. eds., 1863); 48 CALVIN!, supra, at 277.
87. See representative articles in CALVIN'S THOUGHT ON ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL
ISSUES AND THE RELATIONSHIP OF CHURCH AND STATE (Richard c. Gamble ed., 1992)
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These early Calvinist views on separationism came to prominent
expression in the New England colonies and states.88 New England
Calvinists - variously called Puritans, Pilgrims, Congregationalists,
Independents, Brownists, and Separatists - generally conceived of
the church and the state as two separate covenantal associations, two
seats of Godly authority in the community, each with a distinct polity
and calling. The church was to be governed by pastoral, pedagogical,
and diaconal authorities who were called to preach the word, adminis
ter the sacraments, teach the young, and care for the poor and the
needy. The state was to be governed by executive, legislative, and
judicial authorities who were called to enforce law, punish crime, cul
tivate virtue, and protect peace and order.
Church and state officials were to remain separate. Church officials
were prohibited from holding political office, serving on juries, inter
fering in governmental affairs, endorsing political candidates, or cen
suring the official conduct of a statesman. Political officials, in turn,
were prohibited from holding ministerial office, interfering in internal
ecclesiastical government, performing sacerdotal functions of clergy,
or censuring the official conduct of a cleric. But church and state offi
cials could and should make common cause in serving the common
good of the community as a whole - cooperating in the maintenance
of public religion, morality, education, charity, and other good works.
4.

Two Swords

The Anglican tradition returned to a variation on the two-swords
theory, but now with the English Crown, not the pope, holding the
superior sword within the unitary Christian commonwealth of
England. In a series of Acts passed in the 1530s, King Henry VIII
severed all legal and political ties between the Church in England and
the pope.89 The Supremacy Act of 1534 declared the English monarch
to be "the only supreme head" of the Church and Commonwealth of
England, with final spiritual and temporal authority.90 The English
monarchs and Parliaments thus established a uniform doctrine, liturgy,
and canon by issuing the Book of Common Prayer, the Thirty-Nine
and the classic study of JOSEF BOHATEC, CALVINS LEHRE VON STAAT UND KIRCHE MIT
BESONDERER B ERUCKSICHTIGUNG DES 0RGANISMUSGEDANKENS (1968).
88. EMIL OBERHOLZER, JR., DELINQUENT SAINTS: DISCIPLINARY ACTIONS IN THE
EARLY CONGREGATIONAL CHURCHES IN MASSACHUSETTS ( 1 956); DAVID A. WEIR,
COVENANT AND COVENANTING IN SEVENTEENTH-CENTURY NEW ENGLAND (forthcoming
2004). See key documents in WILLISTON WALKER, THE CREEDS AND PLATFORMS OF
CONGREGATIONALISM (1991).
89. See sources in SOURCES OF ENGLISH CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY 304-12 (Carl F.
Stephenson & Frederick G. Marcham eds. & trans., 1937).
90. Reprinted in id. at 311. For further discussion of The Supremacy Act of 1534, see 2
JOSEF LECLER, TOLERATION AND THE REFORMATION 329-79 (1960).
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Articles, and the Authorized (King James) Version of the Bible. They
also assumed final legal responsibility for poor relief, marriage, educa
tion, and other activities, delegating some of this responsibility back to
Convocation, the church courts, or parish clergy. Clergy were
appointed, supervised, and removed by the Crown and its delegates.
Communicant status in the Church of England was rendered a condi
tion for citizenship status in the Commonwealth of England. Contra
ventions of royal religious policy were punishable both as heresy and
as treason. A whole battery of apologists rose to the defense of this
alliance of Church, Commonwealth, and Crown, notably Thomas
Cranmer, Richard Hooker, and Robert Filmer.
Richard Hooker's lengthy apologia for the Anglican establishment
was particularly significant, for he offered a sustained rebuke to
English separationists. In the later sixteenth and seventeenth centuries
various non-Anglican Protestant groups in England - Puritans,
Brownists, Congregationalists, Baptists, Quakers, and other self-styled
"Separatists"91 - had called the English church and state to a greater
separation from each other and from the Church of Rome. They also
had called their own faithful to a greater separation from the Church
and Commonwealth of England. Richard Hooker had no patience
with any of this. In his massive Laws of Ecclesiastical Polity (15931600), Hooker recognized a "natural separation" between the Church
and the Commonwealth of England. But he insisted that these
two bodies had to be "under one chief Governor."92 For Hooker,
Separatists who sought to erect "a wall of separation" between Church
and Commonwealth would destroy English unity and deprive its
church of the natural and necessary patronage and protection of the
Crown. It was a short step from this argument to the bitter campaigns
of persecution in the early seventeenth century that drove many thou
sands of Separatists from England to Holland and to North America.

91 . On various English and New England "separatists" see NORMAN ALLEN BAXTER,
HISTORY OF THE FREEWILL BAPTISTS: A STUDY IN NEW ENGLAND SEPARATISM (1957);
EDWARD H . BLOOMFIELD, THE OPPOSITION TO THE ENGLISH SEPARATISTS, 1 570-1625
(1981); STEPHEN BRACHLOW, THE COMMUNION OF SAINTS: RADICAL PURITAN AND
SEPARATIST ECCLESIOLOGY 1570-1625 (1988); CHAMPLIN BURRAGE, THE EARLY
ENGLISH DISSENTERS IN THE LIGHT OF RECENT RESEARCH (1550-1641) (1912); JAMES
ROBERT COGGINS, JOHN SMYTH'S CONGREGATION: ENGLISH SEPARATISM, MENNONITE
INFLUENCE, AND THE ELECT NATION 29-68, 128-32 (1991); TIMOTHY GEORGE, JOHN
ROBINSON AND THE ENGLISH SEPARATIST TRADITION (1982); C.C. GOEN, REVIVALISM
AND SEPARATISM IN NEW ENGLAND, 1740-1800 (1962); B . R. WHITE, THE ENGLISH
SEPARATIST TRADITION: FROM THE MARIAN MARTYRS TO THE PILGRIM FATHERS (1971);
and Verne Dale Morey, The Brownist Churches: A Study in English Separatism, 1553-1 630
(1954) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Harvard University) (on file with author).
92. RICHARD HOOKER, OF THE LAWS OF ECCLESIASTICAL POLITY 129-38 (Arthur
Stephen McGrade ed., 1989); see DREISBACH, pp. 73-76; HAMBURGER, pp. 32-38.
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D. Significance of This Earlier History
Professors Dreisbach and Hamburger pick up the story from here,
each pausing to inspect the views of Richard Hooker and Roger
Williams (Dreisbach, pp. 73-79; Hamburger, pp. 32-45, 50-53) before
plunging into more familiar texts by James Burgh, Thomas Paine,
Isaac Backus, James Madison, George Washington, Thomas Jefferson,
and many others. Dreisbach recognizes full well "that the 'wall of
separation' metaphor has a long history in Western theological and
political discourse" before the eighteenth century (Dreisbach, p. 104),
topics on which he has written astutely before.93 In this book,
Dreisbach focuses deliberately on American examples.
Hamburger, however, argues that "in the centuries prior to 1800
the idea of the separation of church and state appealed to only a tiny
fraction of Europeans and Americans" (Hamburger, p. 21). The
occasional references to separation that do exist before Jefferson's
1802 Letter to the Danbury Baptists, he argues, were at best only
"nascent manifestations" of the ideal of separation of church and state
(Hamburger, p. 29). "Earlier Christians . . . adopted many different
conceptions of the relationship between church and state, but they did
not ordinarily, if ever, propose a separation, let alone a wall of separa
tion, between these two institutions" (Hamburger, p. 29). Seven
teenth- and early eighteenth-century writers in America, England, and
France generally said "little if anything about" separation
(Hamburger, p. 78), and none "even came close to" advocating sepa
ration of church and state (Hamburger, p. 79). Even the more radical
writers of the day, from John Locke and Roger Williams to Marquis
de Condorcet and Thomas Paine, had formulations of separations that
were "very limited" in scope (Hamburger, pp. 53, 60, 89), and at best
"sort of," "not quite," "close to," " almost espoused" formulations of a
separation of church and state (Hamburger, pp. 53, 57, 60, 65, 79, 89).
And even these prototypical views "made little impression"
(Hamburger, p. 60) and "found little support" (Hamburger, p. 53).
In fact, there was a great deal of support for separation of church
and state in earlier American and European traditions, little of which
makes its way into Professor Hamburger's volume. As the foregoing
thumbnail sketch illustrates, Catholics and Protestants alike had
robust, diverse, and evolving theories of separation of church and
state, many grounded in the Bible and classical texts. The archives
hold a massive farrago of unexplored sermons and commentaries on
the many biblical passages that call for (walls of) separation between
the faithful and fallen, the religious and the political, the priests and
the people, the church and the state. The archives also hold a whole
arsenal of legal and political provisions that churchmen and statesmen
93.

See comments in DREISBACH, pp. 72-73, and sources in DREISBACH, pp. 250-51.
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forged over the centuries to delimit their respective offices and powers
and to determine their mutual responsibilities and rights.
Much of this rich history is lost in Hamburger's early chapters that
repeatedly juxtapose the views of "religious establishments" and
"religious dissenters." Religious establishmentarians, in his view, were
by definition not separationist. Religious dissenters were not separa
tionist either, he argues, but were "falsely accused" of being so by the
religious establishment (Hamburger, pp. 65-80).
The binocular of establishment versus dissenter, however, does not
bring the many varieties of separationism into proper focus. Religious
establishmentarians and religious dissenters alike taught different
forms of separationism, and these often clashed. Thus, for example, in
seventeenth-century England, Calvinists who sought a different sepa
ration of church and state than prevailed in the Anglican establish
ment were called dissenters. In seventeenth-century New England,
however, Calvinists were the religious establishment and the
Anglicans in their midst were the dissenters. Yet the seventeenth
century Calvinist doctrines of separation of church and state were
virtually identical on both sides of the Atlantic.94 Similarly, eighteenth
century Presbyterians in Scotland were part of the religious establish
ment, but when they moved to America, they were usually treated as
religious dissenters, even in Puritan New England. And while Profes
sor Hamburger lumps these Presbyterians in with other American
dissenters (Hamburger, pp. 92-94, 102-04), American Presbyterians
not only divided bitterly on issues of separationism,95 but their views
differed markedly from those taught by other so-called "religious
dissenters" in America - Baptists, Quakers, Methodists, Lutherans,
Moravians, Mennonites,,Reformed, and others.96
Professor Hamburger too readily equates the separation of church
and state with the disestablishment of religion in judging the
pre-nineteenth-century material.97 He thus too easily dismisses the
94. See, e.g., EDMUND s. MORGAN, PURITAN POLITICAL IDEAS: 1558-1794 (1965); John
Witte, Jr., How to Govern a City on a Hill: The Early Puritan Contributions to American
Constitutionalism, 39 EMORY L.J. 4 1 (1990).
95. For an example, see the debates over reformulation of the provisions on church and
state in the Westminster Confession (1647), in 1 PHILLIP SCHAFF, CREEDS OF
CHRISTENDOM WITH A HISTORY AND CRITICAL NOTES 807-08 (4th ed. 1877) [hereinafter
CREEDS); 3 SCHAFF, supra, at 653-54; WALKER, supra note 88, at 388-97.
96. See detailed religious demography in EDWIN SCOTT GAUSTAD & PHILIP L.
BARLOW, NEW HISTORICAL ATLAS OF RELIGION IN AMERICA (2001).
97. See, e.g., HAMBURGER, pp. 23, 36-38, 53-54, 58, 79-83 (arguing repeatedly that cer
tain texts were not really separationist because their authors still countenanced an estab
lished religion). This stands in contrast to a central method and thesis of the rest of his vol
ume: "Underlying the story recorded here is the distinction between the separation of
church and state and the constitutional freedom from a religious establishment. For many
Americans, the differences between these ideals has become difficult to discern." See exam
ples in HAMBURGER, pp. 6-9. "The difference, however, was of profound importance to ear
lier Americans." HAMBURGER, pp. 479-80.
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varieties of separation that were taught by religious establishmentari
ans - even when they expressly called for (a wall of) separation
between church and state. And he too easily passes over many ser
mons and theological writings of "religious dissenters" that were not
directed to advocating the disestablishment of religion - even though
they, too, sometimes sounded in separationist terms.
Moreover, after learning that the pre-nineteenth-century refer
ences to separationism that Hamburger does discuss were all only
"partial," "incomplete," "nascent," "close to," but "not quite" separa
tionist, a reader could rightly expect a very clear and detailed defini
tion of separation of church and state against which these writings are
being measured. But no such definition appears. Professor Hamburger
properly warns the reader (Hamburger, pp 8-14) that eighteenth
century definitions of separationism should not be equated with the
twentieth-century separationism of the Supreme Court. I agree
completely. But what then is the eighteenth-century definition of
separation of church and state against which earlier theories are being
judged? The book does not say.
.

IV.

.

EXODUS: THE ROUTES OF AMERICAN SEPARATIONISM

A. Five Varieties of Separationism
None of this is to say that eighteenth- and nineteenth�century
Americans simply repeated earlier European formulations of separa
tion of church . and state. To the contrary, as both Professors
Hamburger and Dreisbach make clear, American writers adopted and
adapted the principle of separation of church and state to express a
variety of new (or newly prominent) ideals. At least five understand
ings of separationism became commonplace in the opening decades of
the American republic.
First, separationism aimed to protect the church from the state.
This had long been a dominant motif in European Catholic and Prot
estant writings. The concern was to protect church affairs from state
intrusion, the clergy · from the magistracy, and ecclesiastical rules and
rites from political coercion and control. This accent continued and
grew in American discussions of separationism. George Washington,
for example, wrote in 1789 of the need "to establish effectual barriers
against the horrors of spiritual tyranny, and every species of religious
persecution" so that there was no threat to "the religious rights of any
ecclesiastical Society."98 This ideal of separationism was captured in
·

98. Quoted and discussed in DREISBACH, pp. 84-85.
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state and federal constitutional guarantees of freedom of association
and free exercise rights of religious groups.99
Second, separationism served to protect the liberty of conscience
of the religious believer from the intrusions of both church and state.
This had been an early and enduring aspiration of some Anabaptist
and Quaker separationist writers in Europe.100 It became common
place in eighteenth- and nineteenth-century America. "Every Man has
an equal Right to follow the Dictates of his own Conscience in the
Affairs of Religion . . . and to follow his Judgment wherever it leads
him," one pamphleteer wrote. This is "an equal Right with any Rulers
be they Civil or Ecclesiastical. " 1 0 1 This goal of separationism was cap
tured in the numerous state constitutional guarantees of liberty of
conscience.102
Third, separationism served to protect the state from the church.
This was a more novel sentiment in early America, but it was pressed
with increasing alacrity at the turn of the nineteenth century. Tunis
Wortman, for example, wrote: "Religion and government are equally
necessary, but their interests should be kept separate and distinct."103
"Upon no plan, no system, can they become united, without endan
gering the purity and usefulness of both - the church will corrupt the
state, and the state pollute the church."104 This goal of separationism
was particularly pronounced in state constitutional and statutory pro
hibitions on clerical participation in political office.105
Fourth, separationism served to protect individual state govern
ments from interference by the federal government in governing their
local religious affairs. As Professor Dreisbach argues, this "jurisdic
tional view" of separationism was part and product of the American
founders' experiment in federalism (Dreisbach, pp. 55-70). The found99. For examples, see JOHN WITIE, JR., RELIGION AND THE AMERICAN
CONSTITUTIONAL EXPERIMENT: ESSENTIAL RIGHTS AND LIBERTIES 42-44, 88-91, 246-49
(2000) [hereinafter WITIE, RELIGION AND THE AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL
EXPERIMENT].
100. See, e.g. , WILLIAM PENN, THE GREAT CASE OF LIBERTY OF CONSCIENCE (1670),
reprinted in THE POLITICAL WRITINGS OF WILLIAM PENN 79-119, esp. 1 0 1 , 1 12 (Andrew R.
Murphy ed., 2002). See other examples in Brian Tierney, Religious Rights: A Historical Per
spective. in RELIGIOUS LIBERTY IN WESTERN THOUGHT 29, 50-55 (Noel B. Reynolds & w.
Cole Durham, Jr. eds., 1 996).
1 01 . ELISHA WILLIAMS, THE ESSENTIAL RIGHTS AND LIBERTIES OF PROTESTANTS 7-8
(1 744).
102. See samples in WITIE, RELIGION AND THE AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL
EXPERIMENT, supra note 99, at 39-42, 88-89, 246-49.
103. Quoted and discussed in HAMBURGER, p. 122 (internal quotation marks and cita
tion omitted).
1 04. Id. (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).
105. See HAMBURGER, pp. 79-88; Daniel L. Dreisbach, The Constitution 's Forgotten
Religion Clause: Reflections on the Article VJ Religious Test Ban, 38 J. CHURCH & ST. 261
(1 996).
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ers regarded religion as a "subject reserved to the jurisdictions of the
individual, religious societies, and state governments; the federal gov
ernment was denied all authority in matters pertaining to religion"
(Dreisbach, p. 62). The individual's jurisdiction over religion was pro
tected by the constitutional principle of liberty of conscience. The
church's jurisdiction was protected by the constitutional principle of
free exercise and free association. The individual state's jurisdiction
was protected by the constitutional principle of federalism. On this
jurisdictional reading of separationism, state governments were free to
patronize, protect, and participate in religious affairs, so long as they
did not trespass the religious freedom of religious bodies or individu
als. But the federal government was entirely foreclosed from the same.
Fifth, separationism served to protect society from unwelcome par
ticipation in and support for religion. In the eighteenth century, this
view of separationism drove the many campaigns against mandatory
payments of tithes, required participation in swearing oaths, or forced
attendance at religious services. In the nineteenth century, this view
of separationism spurred the call to separate religion and politics
altogether. This was the most novel, and the most controversial, form
of separationist logic to emerge in early American history.
Hamburger documents the nineteenth-century unfolding of this
fifth form of strict separationist logic and rhetoric in stunning detail.
Attempts to implement this separationism at law caused endless
rounds of bitter fighting throughout the nineteenth century. The
fighting began with the infamous battles between Federalists and
Republicans over the election of Thomas Jefferson (Hamburger, pp.
1 1 1 -43). The fighting continued in the successive state (and sometimes
federal) battles over freemasonry, Sunday laws, slavery and abolition,
marriage and divorce reforms, religious education, enforcement of
Christian morals, and more (Hamburger, pp. 178-79, 244-45, 262-67,
305-08, 355-57, 391-99, 414-17, 445-46). And the fighting broke out yet
again in the great, but ultimately futile, battles to amend the United
States Constitution, either with overtly pro-Christian or covertly
antireligious sentiments (Hamburger, pp. 287-334).
B.

First Amendment Separationism?

It is an interesting, but largely passing, question for both these
authors which of these views of separationism, if any, informed the
First Amendment religion clauses. That subject has been argued at
inordinate length by others, and the authors accordingly state their
views briefly.106 The First Amendment provides: "Congress shall make
106. See DREISBACH, pp. 55-7 6; HAMBURGER, pp. 9-13, 89-107 ; see a/so Daniel L.
Dreisbach, A Lively and Fair Experiment: Religion and the American Constitutional Tradi
tion, 49 EMORY L.J. 223 (2000) (reviewing WITTE, RELIGION AND THE AMERICAN
CONSTITUTIONAL EXPERIMENT, supra note 99); Philip A. Hamburger, A Constitutional
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no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free
exercise thereof."1 07 Both authors agree that this language has nothing
to do with the fifth form of strict separation of religion and politics.
Dreisbach argues that the First Amendment was the crowning piece of
the fourth type of "jurisdictional" separationism. It was a guarantee
that the federal government ("Congress") could make no law
respecting religion, for such matters were left to the states, who were
unaffected by the First Amendment (Dreisbach, pp. 1-4, 58-70).
Hamburger argues that the First Amendment does not deal with sepa
rationism at all. For him, the First Amendment was a demand for:
a religious liberty that limited civil government; especially civil legisla
tion, rather than for a religious liberty conceived as a separation of
church and state. Moreover, in attempting to prohibit the civil legislation
that would establish religion, [it] sought to preserve the power of gov
ernment to legislate on religion in other ways." (Hamburger, p. 107)

The cryptic record of the debates over the First Amendment re
ligibn clauses can support both these readings - and many others. My
own reading is that the Disestablishment and Free Exercise Clauses
provided interlocking guarantees that at least touched on the first four
types of separationism, but not on the fifth. In iny view, the Free Ex�
ercise Clause was intended to outlaw Congressional proscriptions of
religion - actions that unduly burdened the conscience, restricted
religious exercise, discriminated against religion, or invaded the
autonomy of. churches and other religious bodies. The Disestablish
ment Clause was intended to outlaw Congressional prescriptions of
religion - actions that coerced the conscience, mandated forms of
religious exercise, discriminated in favor of religion, or improperly
allied the state with churches or other religious bodies.108 While the
term "separation of church and state" makes no appearance in the
First Amendment text, the principle of separationism does, and in
various forms. 109

Right of Religious Exemption: An Historical Perspective, 60 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 915 (1992);
Philip A. Hamburger, Equality and Diversity: The Eighteenth-Century Debate About Equal
Protection and Equal Civil Rights, 1992 SUP. Cr. REV. 295.

107.

U.S. CONST.

108. WITTE,
note 99, at 37-86.

amend. I.

RELIGION AND THE AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL EXPERIMENT,

supra

109. See also id. at 91-96 (arguing similarly that while the term "separation of church
and state" does not appear in the texts of nineteenth-century state constitutions, the princi
ple of separation of church and state does). Interestingly, while Hamburger eschews such
analysis regarding the First Amendment, he interprets several nineteenth-century federal
and state provisions as separationist in spirit, even if not in letter. See, e.g. , HAMBURGER, pp.
90-107.
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C.

Thomas Jefferson 's Separationism

The more interesting question for both these authors is what views
of separationism were espoused by Thomas Jefferson. More particu
larly, what views did Thomas Jefferson espouse in his famous 1802
Letter to the Danbury Baptist Association, which the Supreme Court
has repeatedly used as the authoritative gloss on the First Amendment
text?1 10
The Danbury Letter must be understood in political context, and
both authors take pains to provide the same.111 Less than two years
before, Jefferson had barely survived a brutal Presidential campaign
against incumbent John Adams. Leaders of Adams's Federalist party
charged that Jefferson was an immoral, deist, Jacobin infidel, bent on
severing government from its necessary religious roots and essential
clerical alliances. Particularly vehement in this attack were the New
England clergy who presided over the established Congregationalist
churches. Leaders of Jefferson's Republican party countered that
Jefferson was a Christian, albeit of an unusual sort, who saw separa
tion of church and state as essential to the protection of religious lib
erty. Some went further and urged officious establishment churchmen
either to give up their political platforms or to give up their political
perquisites. Clergy should not claim exemptions from government
burdens yet claim special entitlements to preach about politics. The
political and theological stakes in this political battle were very high.
Jefferson, already no warm friend of clergy, came away with a bitter
hatred for the established clergy of New England - those "barbari
ans" and "bigots in religion and government," as he complained
privately.m
One year into his Presidency, Thomas Jefferson received a
congratulatory letter from a small company of Baptists in Danbury,
Connecticut. Chafing under the restrictions and taxes imposed by the
Congregationalist establishment of Connecticut, this obscure company
of Baptists also requested Jefferson's counsel on how better to secure
religious liberty in the state. Jefferson saw this letter as a welcome
occasion to sow "useful truths and principles" among friends and foes
alike about his views of religious liberty (Dreisbach, p. 43). He aimed
in particular, as he put it, to condemn "the alliance of church and
state, under the authority of the Constitution" and to explain why he
as President did not offer Thanksgiving Day proclamations and

1 10. For Supreme Court cases that cite the letter, see
pp. 6-7, 454-78.

DREISBACH,

pp. 97-106, and

HAMBURGER,

1 1 1. See DREISBACH, pp. 25-54; HAMBURGER, pp. 1 11-55.

1 12. EDWIN S. GAUSTAD, SWORN ON THE ALTAR OF GOD: A RELIGIOUS BIOGRAPHY
OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 93 (1996) (internal quotation marks omitted).
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prayers, even though he had done so as Governor of Virginia.113 The
first draft of the letter sought to accomplish both goals. His Attorney
General, Levi Lincoln, advised Jefferson to drop the discussion of
Thanksgiving proclamations, for fear of offending Republican friends
and Federalist foes alike.114 Jefferson obliged him, and issued the final
letter on January 1, 1802. After its opening salutation the full letter
reads:
Believing with you that religion is a matter which lies solely between
Man & his God, that he owes account to none other for his faith or his
worship, that the legitimate powers of government reach actions only, &
not opinions, I contemplate with sovereign reverence that act of the
whole American people which declared that their legislature should
"make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the
free exercise thereof," thus building a wall of separation between Church
& State. [A]dhering to this expression of the supreme will of the nation
in behalf of the rights of conscience, I shall see with sincere satisfaction
the progress of those sentiments which tend to restore to man all his
natural rights, convinced he has no natural right in opposition to his so
cial duties.
I reciprocate your kind prayers for the protection & blessing of the
common father and creator of man, and tender you for yourselves &
your religious association, assurances of my high respect & esteem.11 5

Professor Dreisbach reads this letter as a part and product of
Jefferson's jurisdictional separationism. Jefferson said many times that
no branch of the federal government, including the executive branch,
had jurisdiction over religion. Religion was entirely a state and local
matter. As he put it famously in his Second Inaugural:
In matters of religion, I have considered that its free exercise is placed by
the constitution independent of the powers of the general [federal] gov
ernment. I have therefore undertaken, on no occasion, to prescribe the
religious exercises suited to it; but have left them, as the constitution
found them, under the direction and discipline of State or Church
authorities.11 6

Governor Jefferson's ample earlier religious activities thus provided
little guidance or precedent for what he could do as President. As
President he had to be more circumspect in matters religious. In his
return letter, therefore, President Jefferson did not counsel the

1 13. DREISBACH, pp.
DREISBACH, pp. 137-39.

43-44. Governor Jefferson's 1779 Thanksgiving proclamation is in

114. Levi's letter is quoted in DREISBACH, pp. 44-45. The changes that Jefferson made
are tabulated in DREISBACH, pp. 48-49.
1 15. DREISBACH, p. 1 48. This edition corrects the punctuation of the common edition in
8 T HE WRITINGS OF THOMAS J EFFERSON 1 13-14 (H. Washington ed., 1853-54), and prop
erly uses the original word "legitimate" rather than "legislative."
1 1 6.

DREISBACH,

p. 152 (internal quotation marks omitted).
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Danbury Baptists on how to undo the Connecticut establishments, nor
did he condemn the establishment clergy themselves. Jefferson's was a
more subtle and suitable presidential approach of sowing "useful
truths and principles" about the meaning of religious liberty in the
young nation (Dreisbach, p. 53).
After a meticulous sifting of the various drafts of the Danbury
Letter, Dreisbach concludes:
A universal principle of church-state separation applicable at all levels of
civil government - local, state, and federal - was not among the seeds
deliberately sown. Jefferson explicitly .stated that his project was to ad
dress church-state relations "under the authority of the Constitution,"
and he clearly recognized that the First Amendment, with its metaphoric
barrier, was applicable to the federal government only . . . . [T]he "wall of
separation" metaphor reconceptualized the First Amendment in terms of
separation between church and (federal) state. (Dreisbach, pp. 53-54)

The final letter said nothing directly about the free exercise or
nonestablishment of religion. But Jefferson's view of the nonestab
lishment prohibition on religious establishments by the federal gov
ernment "was much more expansive than virtually all previous inter
pretations,'' for he had intended to go so far as to outlaw presidential
Thanksgiving Day proclamations (Dreisbach, p. 54).
Professor Hamburger reads Jefferson's .letter as evidence of Jeffer
son's abiding anticlericalism - his desire to separate clergy, and
indeed religion altogether, from the state and the political process.
Jefferson hated the clergy, Hamburger argues, and the bitter 1800
campaign only deepened his resolve to separate them from matters
political. Owing to their religious privileges, the clergy were both
politically and psychologically powerful. They held a "tyranny over
the mind of man,'' dulling them into "steady habits,'' stable institu
tions, and routine rituals that impeded experimentation and novelty,
the lifeblood of liberty and progress (Hamburger, pp. 148-49).
It would be better for the clergy to stick to their specialty of soul
craft, rather than interfere in the specialty of statecraft. Religion is
merely "a separate department of knowledge,'' Jefferson wrote, along
side other specialized disciplines like physics, biology, law, politics,
and medicine. Preachers are the specialists in religion, and are hired
by churches to devote their time and energy to this specialty. As
Jefferson put it:
Whenever, therefore, preachers, instead of a lesson in religion, put them
off with a discourse on the Copernican system, on chemical affinities, on
the construction of government, or the characters or conduct of those
administering it, it is a breach of contract, depriving their audience of the
kind of service for which they are salaried.117
117. Letter from Thomas Jefferson to P.H. Wendover (March 13, 1815), quoted and dis
152-55.

cussed in HAMBURGER, pp.
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This is a marvelous insight into one aspect of Jefferson's theory of
religious liberty. It goes beyond the typical argument that Jefferson's
theory of society sought to privatize religion, leaving the public square
open to the discourse of reason. What Hamburger shows is that Jeffer
son's theory of knowledge also sought to compartmentalize religion,
leaving the department of politics and law free from clerical influence
or interference. This is not only an intriguing new epistemology of
separation. It is also an anticipation of the positivist philosophy of
knowledge made famous two decades later by French philosopher
Auguste Comte that sought to differentiate all of human knowledge
into a series of separate disciplines and specialties.118
While Hamburger's account of Jefferson's anticlericalism i s com
pelling, I find less compelling his argument that this was the import of
Jefferson's 1802 Danbury Letter. First, this religious specialization
thesis is the subject of an unsent letter of 1815, prepared more than a
decade after the Danbury Letter. Second, there is not a word of anti
clericalism in the Danbury Letter. Hamburger says that Jefferson's
phrase "with sovereign reverence" was intended irony aimed to tweak
the New England establishment clergy (Hamburger, p. 147). But why
should it be ironic or strategic? Jefferson did revere the divine, albeit
unconventionally. Moreover, in the letter's concluding paragraph,
which Hamburger does not quote, Jefferson did show "sovereign
reverence" and invoked God's name in reciprocating the Danbury
Baptists' prayers.
Both these readings of Jefferson's Letter to the Danbury Baptists
are novel and provocative. Despite their differences, they both show
how multiple views of separation of church and state can be plausibly
read in this famous text. I read another view of separationism in the
text, namely, Jefferson's explicit concern to separate church and state
for the protection of individual conscience. Liberty of conscience had
long been one of Jefferson's central preoccupations. He had stated his
view with particular flourish in his 1786 Act for the Establishment of
Religious Freedom.119 This preoccupation with liberty of conscience
continues in his 1802 Letter, as much of the long first sentence makes
clear: "religion is a matter which lies solely between a Man & His god,
that he owes account to none other for his faith or his worship, that
the legitimate powers of government reach actions only, & not opin
ions . . . . " Then after reciting his memorable "thus building a wall of
separation between Church & State," he says that "this expression of
the supreme will of the nation [was] in behalf of the rights of

1 18. See
1 853).

THE POSITIVE PHILOSOPHY OF AUGUSTE COMTE

1 1 9. 12 THE STATUTES AT LARGE .
cluded in DREISBACH, pp. 133-35.

. . OF VIRGINIA

(Harriet Martineau ed.,

84-86. The 1779 Draft Bill is in
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conscience," and designed "to restore to man all his natural rights,
convinced he has no natural right in opposition to his social duties."120
Separationism thus assured individuals of their natural, inalienable
right of conscience, which could be exercised freely and fully to the
point of breaching the peace or shirking social duties. Jefferson is not
talking here of separating politics and religion altogether, nor is he
eschewing federal religious activity altogether. Indeed, in the last
paragraph of his letter, President Jefferson performed an avowedly
religious act of offering prayers on behalf of his Baptist correspon
dents: "I reciprocate your kind prayers for the protection and blessing
of the common father and creator of man."121
D. ·Separationism and Anti-Catholicism
The bitter political struggles of 1800 were only the opening shots in
a century-long American battle over the meaning and means of sepa
rating church and state. It was a battle fought in Congress and in the
courts, in states and on the frontier, in churches and in the schools, in
clubs and at the ballot box. It was largely a war of words, occasionally
a war of arms. The battles included many familiar foes - Republicans
and Federalists, the Nortq _and the South, N�tive Americans and new
immigrants, the cit_ies and the countryside. It als.o included a host of
newly established political groups: the American Protestant Associa
tion, the Know-Nothing Party, the Ku Klux Klan, the American
Protective Association, the National Liberal Le;igue, the · American
Secular Union, the National Reform Association, the Masonic
League, and many more. All these antagonists make appearances on
Hamburger's wide stage, tell their separationist stories in long-quoted
pamphlets, briefs, and speeches, before yielding the stage to others.
This is an extraordinary dra�a that Hamburger tells with flourish and
power.
I would like to focus on just one running episode in this great
battle, the repeated clashes between Protestants and Catholics over
separationism. The long and sad story of the anti�Catholicism
of American Protestants is well known. Around 1790, American
Protestants and Catholics had seemed ready to put their bitter and
bloody battles behind them. But with the swelling tide of Catholic
emigres into America after the 1820s - all demanding work, building
schools, establishing charities, converting souls, and gaining influence
- native-born Protestants and patriots began to protest. Catholic
bashing became a favorite sport of preachers and pamphleteers. Then
rioting and church burnings broke out in the 1830s and 1840s, followed

120. Quoted in DREISBACH, p. 148 (emphasis added).
121. See id.
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by even more vicious verbal pillorying and repressive actions against
Catholics that continued well into the twentieth century. This sad and
ugly story is well known, and Hamburger recounts it faithfully
(Hamburger, pp. 191-251, 272-302).
What Hamburger makes clear is that the principle of separation
of church and state became one of the strong new weapons in the
anti-Catholic arsenal. Foreign Catholics were for the union of church
and state, the propagandists claimed. American Protestants were for
the separation of church and state. To be a Catholic was to oppose
separationism and American-style liberties. To be a Protestant was to
defend separationism and American-style liberties. To bash a Catholic
was thus not a manifestation of religious bigotry, but a demonstration
of American patriotism. Protestants and patriots began to run closely
together, often tripping over each other to defend separationism and
to decry and deny Catholics for their failure to do so (Hamburger, pp.
201-240).
Hamburger properly indicts scores of Protestant leaders and fol
lowers for their participation or complicity in the violence and political
scheming against Catholics on the pretext or platform of separation of
church and state. He properly points to the battles over school and
school funding as the arena where the fighting was fiercest (Ham
burger, pp. 219-29, 322, 340-41, 412-18). All this is a salutary corrective
to more pro-Protestant traditional accounts.122
But it is important that the corrected story not now be read as a
simple dialectic of Protestant separationist hawks versus Catholic
unionist doves. And it is important to be clear that the Protestant
Catholic battle over the doctrine of separation of church and state had
two sides, with Catholics giving as well as taking, winning as well as
losing. Professor Hamburger takes pains to show that not all Protes
tants and Catholics participated in these rivalries and that not all these
rivalries turned on separation of church and state (Hamburger, pp.
219-46). These caveats deserve amplification.
First, many American Catholic clergy were themselves separation
ists, building their views in part on the ancient patristic models of two
communities, two cities, and two powers. 1 23 Moreover, a good number
of American Catholic clergy saw separation of church and state as an
essential principle of religious liberty and embraced the doctrine with
out evident cavil or concern. Alexis de Tocqueville, for one, noted this
in his Democracy in America (1835):
In France I had seen the spirits of religion and of freedom almost always
marching in opposite directions. In America I found them intimately
122. Including my own unduly pro-Protestant reading. See criticisms in Richard W.
Garnett, Francis Bacon Takes on the Ghouls: The "First Principles " of Religious Freedom, 3
GREEN BAG (2d ser.) 447, 453-54 (2000).
123. See supra notes 56-66 and accompanying text.
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linked together in joint reign over the same land. My longing to under
stand the reason for this phenomenon increased daily. To find this out, I
questioned the faithful of all communions; I particularly sought the soci
ety of clergymen, who are the depositaries of the various creeds and have
a personal interest in their survival. As a practicing Catholic I was par
ticularly close to the Catholic priests, with some of whom I soon estab
lished a certain intimacy. I expressed my astonishment and revealed my
doubts to each of them; I found that they all agreed with each other ex
cept about details; all thought that the main reason for the quiet sway of
religion over their country was the compete separation of church and
state. I have no hesitation in stating that throughout my stay in America I
met nobody, lay or cleric, who did not agree about that.124

Second, many Protestant anti-Catholic writings started not so
much as attacks upon American Catholics as counterattacks to several
blistering papal condemnations of Protestantism, democracy, religious
liberty, and separation of church and state. In Mirari vos (1832), for
example, Pope Gregory XVI condemned in no uncertain terms all
churches that deviated from the Church of Rome, and all states that
granted liberty of conscience, free exercise, and free speech to their
citizens.125 For the pope it was an "absurd and erroneous proposition
which claims that liberty of conscience must be maintained for every
one. "126 The pope "denounced freedom to publish any writings what
ever and disseminate them to the people . . . . The Church has always
taken action to destroy the plague of bad books."127 He declared
anathema against the "detestable insolence and probity" of Luther
and other Protestant "sons of Belial," those "sores and disgraces
of the human race" who "joyfully deem themselves 'free of all.' "128
Even worse, the Pope averred, were "the plans of those who desire
vehemently to separate the Church from the state, and to break the
mutual concord between temporal authority and the priesthood."129
The reality, the Pope insisted, was that state officials "received their
authority not only for the government of the world, but especially for
the defense of the Church. "130
In the blistering Syllabus of Errors (1864), the papacy condemned
as cardinal errors the propositions that:
124. ALEXIS DE TOCQUEVILLE, DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA 295 (George Lawrence
trans., J.P. Mayer ed., 1969) (paragraph breaks removed).
125. See HAMBURGER, pp. 229-34 (discussing some of this papal document and Protes
tant reactions thereto).
126. Mirari vos (On Liberalism and Religious lndifferentism) (1832) [hereinafter Mirari
vos], available at http://www.petersnet.net/browse/3881.htm, 'II 14 (last visited Sept. 15, 2003).
127. Id. 'II 'II 15-16.
1 28. Id. 'II 19. "Belia!" means the "spirit of evil personified" or "fallen angel." OXFORD
ENGLISH DICTIONARY "Belia!" (1971).
129. Mirari vos, supra note 1 26, 'II 20.
130. Id. 'II 23.
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18. Protestantism is nothing more than another form of the same true
Christian religion, in which it is possible to be equally pleasing to God as
in the Catholic Church.
1 9 . The Church is not a true, and perfect, and entirely free society, nor
does she enjoy peculiar and perpetual rights conferred upon her by her
Divine Founder, but it appertains to the civil power to define what are
the rights and limits with which the Church may exercise authority . . . .

24. The church has not the power of availing herself of force, or any di
rect or indirect temporal power. . . .

55. The Church ought to be separate from the State, and the State from
the Church. 131
In place of these cardinal errors, the. papacy declared that the Catholic
Church was the only true church, which must, as in medieval centuries
past, enjoy power in both spiritual and temporal affairs, unhindered by
the state.132 Six years later, the church declared the pope's teachings to
be infallible and condemned Protestants as "heretics" who dared sub
ordinate the "divine magisterium of the Church" to the "judgment of
each individual. " 133
It is perhaps no surprise that American Protestants repaid such
alarming comments in kind - and then with interest. The pope,
as Americans heard him, had condemned the very existence of
Protestantism and the very fundamentals of American democracy and
liberty - effectively calling the swelling population of American
Catholics to arms. Many Protestants saw in the papacy's favorable
references to its past medieval powers134 specters of the two-swords
theory by which the papacy had claimed supreme rule in a unified
Christendom. 135 This simply could not be for Protestants. Conveniently
armed with new editions of the writings of Martin Luther,136 John
Calvin,137 and others,138 American Protestants repeated much of the
vitriolic anti-Catholic and anticlerical rhetoric that had clattered so
1 3 1 . The Papal Syllabus of Errors (1864), in 2

CREEDS,

supra note 95, at 213, 217-19,

227.
132. Id. at 2 1 8-33, H 20, 24-35, 4 1 -44, 53-54, 75-80.
1 33. The Dogmatic Decrees of the Vatican Council Concerning the Catholic Faith and
the Church of Christ (1870), reprinted in 2 CREEDS, supra note 95, at 234, 236.
1 34. Id. at 221 , 'II 34.
135. See supra notes 67-74.
1 36. See

ERIC W. GRITSCH, A HISTORY OF LUTH ERANISM 1 79-216 (2002); ERIC W.
GRITSCH & ROBERT W. JENSON, LUTHERANISM: THE THEOLOGICAL MOVEMENT AND ITS
CONFESSIONAL WRITINGS ( 1 976).

1 37. See WULFERT DE GREEF, THE WRITINGS OF JOHN CALVIN (Lyle D. Bierma trans.,
Baker Book House Co. 1993) (1989).
1 38. See JOHN ADAMS, A D ISSERTATION ON THE CANON AND FEUDAL LAW (1774),
reprinted in 3 THE WORKS OF JOHN ADAMS 447 (Charles F. Adams ed., 1851) (denouncing
Catholic canon law and papal authority for its intrusions on liberty).
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loudly throughout the sixteenth century. At least initially, the loud
commendation of America's separation of church and state and loud
condemnation of the Catholic union of church and state was more a
rhetorical quid pro quo to the papacy than a political low blow to
American Catholics. Inevitably, there was plenty of political imitation
and plenty of cheap shots taken at the American Catholic clergy, par
ticularly those who echoed the papacy. And inevitably, this rhetoric
brought anti-Catholicism and pro-separationism into close association
- particularly when it was taken up by secular political groups, few of
whom spoke for most mainstream Protestants.
Third, when local anti-Catholic measures did pass, as they too of
ten did, both the United States Supreme Court and Congress some
times provided Catholics with relief. Thus in Cummings v. Missouri
(1866), the Court held that a state may not deprive a Catholic priest of
the right to preach for failure to take a mandatory oath disavowing his
support for the confederate states.139 In Watson v. Jones (1871) and
Bouldin v. Alexander (1872), the Court required civil courts to defer to
the judgment of the highest religious authorities in resolving intra
church disputes, explicitly extending that principle to Catholics.140 In
Church of the Holy Trinity v. United States (1892), the Court refused
to uphold a new federal law forbidding contracts with foreign clergy, a
vital issue for Catholic clergy.141 In Bradfield v. Roberts (1899), the
Court upheld, against Establishment Clause challenge, a federal grant
to build a Catholic hospital in the District of Columbia.142 In Quick
Bear v. Leupp (1908), the Court upheld the federal distribution
of funds to Catholic schools that offered education to Native
Americans.143 In Order of St. Benedict v. Steinhauser (1914), the Court
upheld a monastery's communal ownership of property against claims
by relatives of a deceased monk. 144 In Pierce v. Society of Sisters
(1925), the Court invalidated a state law making public school atten
dance mandatory, thereby protecting the rights of Catholic parents
and schools to educate children in a religious school environment.145 A
good number of these Supreme Court holdings were, in part, expres
sions of the principle of separation of church and state. And there
were more such Catholic victories in state courts, in cases that also
sometimes sounded in separationist terms.146
139. 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 277 (1866).
140. 82 U.S. (15 Wall.) 131 (1872); 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 679 (1871).
141. 143 U.S. 457 (1892).
142. 175 U.S. 291 (1899).
1 43. 210 U.S. 50 (1908).
144. 234 U.S. 640 (1914).
145. 268 U.S. 5 10 (1925); see also HAMBURGER, pp. 417-19, 453.
146. CARL ZOLLMAN, AMERICAN CHURCH LAW (1933).
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Fourth, it is going too far, in my view, to allege that later Protes
tants rewrote history to claim they had invented separationism earlier
and had inscribed it onto American constitutional law (Hamburger,
pp. 201-19, 246-51, 342-59). This charge presupposes that Protestants
did not teach separation of church and state before the mid-nineteenth
century. But they did.147 This charge presupposes that earlier
American constitutional laws did not prescribe separationism. But
they did.148 And this charge presupposes that those who wrote about
the history of Protestant separationism were both falsifying the record
and fortifying their anti-Catholicism. Not only would this be a big
surprise to many Protestant historians who wrote on the history of
church-state relations, but it also does not explain why a host of nine
teenth-century European writers, both Catholic and Protestant Alexis de Tocqueville, Lord Acton, Philip Schaff, Abraham Kuyper,
and many others - with no anti-Catholic ax to grind and no fraudu
lent historiography to press would write so favorably about the long
history of Protestant separationism.149
Finally, all these great campaigns for a strict separation of church
and state, whether or not anti-Catholic in motivation, made rather few
legal changes in nineteenth-century America. The dominant reality
was that liberty of conscience was guaranteed against church and state.
Churches and states retained separate offices and operations yet
cooperated and supported each other in countless ways. The federal
government remained largely removed from religious affairs, leaving
states and local governments to govern questions of religion and
religious liberty. A "mass of organic utterances," as the Supreme
Court put in 1892,150 testify to this reality, which Professor Dreisbach
has detailed in several writings beyond the volume under review.151
This was no paradigm or paradise of American religious liberty. But it

147. See supra notes 75-92 and accompanying text.
148. See supra .notes 98-109 and accompanying text.
149. See ABRAHAM KUYPER, LECTURES ON CALVINISM (1931) (lectures delivered at
Princeton University, 1898) ; ABRAHAM KUYPER. VARIA AMERICANA (1899); PHILIP
SCHAFF, CHURCH AND STATE IN THE UNITED STATES (1888); TOCQUEVILLE, supra note
124; ACTON IN AMERICA: THE AMERICAN JOURNAL OF SIR JOHN ACTON 1853 (S.W.
Jackman ed., 1979). For other such foreign impressions see sources in HENRY T.
TUCKERMAN, AMERICA AND HER COMMENTATORS (1864); AMERICA THROUGH BRITISH
EYES (Allan Nevins ed., 1948); and AMERIKA IN EUROPESE OGEN (K. van Berkel ed.,
1990).
150. Church of the Holy Trinity v. United States, 1 43 U.S. 457, 471 (1892).
151. See, e.g., Daniel L. Dreisbach, In Search of a Christian Commonwealth: An Exami
nation of Selected Nineteenth-Century Commentaries on References to God and the Christian
Religion in the United States Constitlllion, 48 BAYLOR L. REV. 927 (1996). See also the re
cent MARK A. NOLL, AMERICA'S Goo: FROM JONATHAN EDWARDS TO ABRAHAM
LINCOLN (2002) and the massive literature distilled therein.
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does attest to the legal presence of the first four kinds of separation of
church and state, but not the fifth form of strict separationism.152
V.

DEUTERONOMY: WHAT LEGAL PLACE FOR SEPARATIONISM
TODAY?

All this changed dramatically with Everson v. Board of Education
(1947), where Justice Black made strict separationism a mandate of
the First Amendment Establishment Clause.153 As Justice Black put it
for the Everson majority:
The "establishment of religion" clause of the First Amendment means at
least this: Neither a state nor the Federal Government can set up a
church. Neither can pass laws which aid one religion, aid all religions, or
prefer one religion over another. Neither can force nor influence a per
son to go or to remain away from church against his will or force him to
profess a belief or disbelief in any religion. No person can be punished
for entertaining or professing religious beliefs or disbeliefs, for church at
tendance or non-attendance. No tax in any amount, large or small, can be
levied to support any religious activities or institutions, whatever they
may be called, or whatever form they may adopt to teach or practice re
ligion. Neither a state nor the Federal Government can, openly or se
cretly, participate in the affairs of any religious organizations or groups,
and vice versa. In the words of Jefferson, the clause against establishment
of religion by law was intended to erect "a wall of separation between
church and State. "154

Readers of Hamburger's volume will recognize that not a single
statement in Justice Black's lengthy recitation was new. Groups like
the National Liberal League and . the Ku Klux .Klan (of which Justice
Black had been a member), had pressed for all these separationist
precepts, and indeed many more, for decades (Hamburger, pp. 399454). What was new was the elevation of these separationist precepts
from a popular demand to a constitutional command that was binding
on both federal and state governments. Readers of Dreisbach's vol
ume will recognize that this latter move in the name of separation of
church and state was in defiance of another species of separation, the
separation of federal and state governance of religion and religious
liberty. While there may have been good reasons for the Court to
apply the First Amendment to the states, this move defied a basic
structural separation of jurisdictions that the founders, for good or ill,
thought essential to the protection of American religious liberty.155

152. See supra notes 98-105 and accompanying text.
153. 330 U.S. 1 (1947).
154. Everson, 330 U.S. at 15-16.
155. DREISBACH, pp. 97-1 16; Daniel L. Dreisbach, Everson and the Command of His
tory: The Supreme Court, Lessons of History, and the Church-State Debate in America, in
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Much of the rest of the American separationist story has risen to
hornbook familiarity,156 and both authors eschew detailed analysis of
it. It is now well known that, from 1947-1989, the Supreme Court
applied its newly minted separationist logic primarily to issues of edu
cation. In nearly forty cases, the Court largely removed religion from
the public school and largely removed religious schools from state
patronage.157 In Lemon v. Kurtzman (1971), the Court demanded that
all laws must (1) have a secular purpose; (2) have a primary effect that
neither advances nor inhibits religion; and (3) foster no excessive en
tanglement between church and state.158 This constitutional reification
of separationist logic rendered the First Amendment Establishment
Clause a formidable weapon for lower courts to outlaw many remain
ing forms and forums of church-state cooperation.
It is also well known that the Supreme Court of late has aban
doned much of this strict separationism in favor of other principles of
religious liberty - neutrality, accommodationism, noncoercion, equal
treatment, and nonendorsement most prominently.159 Many of these
new Establishment Clause principles have been more deferential to
state laws on religion and thus at least tacitly more sympathetic to the
jurisdictional separationism that Professor Dreisbach has described.
In my view, separation of church and state must remain a vital
principle of American religious liberty - despite its serpentine history
and despite the antireligious words, deeds, and associations that it has
sometimes inspired. Separationism needs to be retained, particularly
for its ancient insight of protecting religious bodies from the state and
for its more recent insight of protecting religious believers from viola
tions by government or religious bodies. Separationism, however, also
needs to be contained, and not used as an antireligious weapon in the
culture wars of the public square, public school, or public court.
Separation of church and state must be viewed as a shield not a sword
in the great struggle to achieve religious liberty for all.
Separation of church and state serves religious liberty best when it
is used prudentially not categorically. James Madison, a firm propo
nent of separationism in later life, warned in 1833 that "it may not be
easy, in every possible case, to trace the line of separation between the
EVERSON REVISITED: RELIGION, EDUCATION, AND LAW AT THE CROSSROADS 23 (Jo
Renee Formicola & Hubert Morken eds., 1997).

156. See a good summary in THOMAS c. BERG, RELIGION AND THE STATE IN A
NUTSHELL (1998).
157. See MICHAEL w. MCCONNELL ET AL., RELIGION AND THE CONSTITUTION (2002);
ROBERT T. MILLER & RONALD B. FLOWERS, TOWARD BENEVOLENT NEUTRALITY:
CHURCH, STATE, AND THE SUPREME COURT (5th ed. 1996).
1 58. Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 612-13 (1971).
1 59. See WITTE, RELIGION AND THE AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL EXPERIMENT, su
pra note 99, at 154-63; cases cited supra notes 26-27.
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rights of Religion & the Civil authority, with such distinctness, as to
avoid collisions & doubts on unessential points."160 This caveat has
become even more salient today. For better or worse, the modem
American welfare state, and now the modem American security state,
reaches very deeply into virtually all aspects of modem life through its
vast network of education, charity, welfare, child care, health care,
construction, zoning, workplace, taxation, immigration, security, and
sundry other regulations. Madison's preferred solution was "an entire
abstinence of the Government from interference [with religion] in any
way whatever, beyond the necessity of preserving public order, &
protecting each sect against trespasses on its legal rights by others."161
This traditional understanding of a minimal state role in the life of so
ciety in general, and of religious bodies in particular - however
alluring it may be in libertarian theory - is no longer realistic in
practice.
It is thus even more imperative today than in Madison's day that
the principle of separation of church and state not be pressed to reach
what Madison called the "unessentials. " It is one thing to outlaw daily
Christian prayers and broadcasted Bible readings from the public
school, quite another thing to ban moments of silence and private
displays of the Decalogue in the same schools. It is one thing to bar
direct tax support for religious education, quite another thing to bar
tax deductions for parents who wish to educate their children in the
faith. It is one thing to prevent government officials from delegating
their core police powers to religious bodies, quite another thing to
prevent them from facilitating the charitable services of voluntary
religious and nonreligious associations alike. It is one thing to outlaw
governmental prescriptions of prayers, ceremonies, and symbols in
public forums, quite another thing to outlaw governmental accommo
dations of private prayers, ceremonies, and symbols in public forums.
To press separationist logic too deeply into the "unessentials" not only
"trivializes" religion in public and private life, as Stephen Carter has
argued.162 It also trivializes the Constitution, converting it from a coda
of cardinal principles of national law into a codex of petty precepts of
local life.

160. Letter from James Madison to Reverend Jasper Adams, reprinted in DREISBACH,
pp. 83 (emphasis added).
161. DREISBACH, supra note 37, at 1 17, 120.
162. STEPHEN L. CARTER, THE CULTURE OF DISBELIEF: How AMERICAN LAW AND
POLITICS TRIVIALIZE RELIGIOUS DEVOTION (1993).

